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NOTES
SELECTED ASPECTS OF THE MISSOURI LAW OF
DEFAMATION; A PLEA FOR JUDICIAL REFORM
It has been said that the terms used in a legal rule must have con-
creteness of reference if the rule is to be applied impartially and if
the results of its application are to be predictable.1 The validity of
this proposition can be amply demonstrated by the Missouri rules
governing libel and slander. Because Missouri courts are attempting
to apply rules whose terms have no "common core of meaning,"2 def-
amation decisions often seem arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent
with immediately preceding decisions of the same court. Certainty
and impartiality are desirable attributes in any area of the law,3 but
they are particularly desirable in the field of defamation. This is true
because a person's reputation-the interest protected-is today es-
sential to his well-being, determining such things as job security,
procurement of passports, admission to professional schools and to
the professions themselves, and, perhaps more cogent still, because
the law of defamation is a limitation upon constitutional guarantees
of freedom of speech and press.4
It is the purpose of this note to investigate the lack of certainty in
selected areas of the Missouri law of libel and to determine the causes,
extent, and consequences, of this deficiency. Three specific problems
will be treated in detail: (1) the problem raised by the requirement
that special damages be pleaded ;5 (2) the problem raised by the con-
stitutional mandate that the jury judge the law as well as the facts ;O
and (3) the problem of the applicability and effect in civil litigation
of the statute defining criminal libel.7 An introductory summary of
the common laws of defamation provides a background for a clearer
understanding of these problems and furnishes a standard to identify
1. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 102-03 (1953).
The phrase "concreteness of reference" is Patterson's. Id. at 103. The text state-
ment does not mean that a legal term must stimulate the identical mental image
in the minds of all of its hearers and readers, but only that there be a "common
core of meaning." See id. at 26-30.
2. Id. at 29.
3. Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 CoLum. L. REv. 696, 709 (1913).
4. U.S. CONST., amend. I; Mo. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8:
That no law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech, no matter
by what means communicated; that every person shall be free to say, write
or publish, or otherwise communicate whatever he will on any subject, being
responsible for all abuses of that liberty; ...
5. Infra § III.
6. Infra § IV.
7. Infra § V.
8. Which Missouri courts theoretically apply. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.010 (1949).
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the extent of Missouri's peculiarities. Following the summary, a
survey of Missouri defamation cases indicates the confusion sur-
rounding certain terms distinctive to this area of the law. This survey
serves both to isolate the source of some specific inconsistencies later
treated in detail, and to make possible an application, by analogy, of
the recommendations concluding this note to areas of law not specifi-
cally treated.
I. THE COMMON LAW
(a) Defamation
The modern law of defamation, like the common law, protects the
interest a person has in preserving a good reputation by providing
redress for communications tending to injure it., Comts, however,
have always had trouble formulating a precise definition of communi-
cations that would have this effect. At early common law it was said
generally that communications tending to hold the plaintiff up to the
hatred, contempt, or ridicule, of his fellows were defamatory."e More
recently this broad definition has been expanded to include communi-
cations tending to lessen the esteem in which the person is held in
his society."
For various reasons, some historicall2 and some practical, the com-
mon law classified defamations on several different bases, as indi-
cated in the chart below. For purposes of the following discussion,
it is important to recognize that each classification had two aspects:
the citerion by which a particular statement was classified and the
e.)flsequeiee which followed once its classification had been deter-
mined. They will be treated in that order.
%. RflSTATESEINT, TORTS § 559 (1938) (hereafter RESTATEIT); PROSSm,
TTS §s 92 (2d ed. 1955) (hereafter PROSSER); 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 5.1(I :5h;) ).
The law does not redress all defamations, and there are two defenses to an
act ion for libel or slander. One of these is truth, an absolute defense. The other,
1m ivilege, is divided into absolute privilege and qualified privilege. A qualified
prviliee is forfeited if the plaintiff can prove "express malice," i.e., that the
privilege was abused. Practically, it makes little difference whether truth and
pi ivifee are treated as affirmative defenses or whether their absence is required
to give rise to a cause of action. For ease of analysis, the term "defamation" will
be used to designate any defamatory communication because, for purposes of solv-
ing the problems discussed in this note, it is immaterial that the communication
may have been true, privileged, or both. See generally PROSSER § 95.
10. RESTATMDMNT § 559, comment b; PROSSER § 92.
11. bhil.
I2. See Comment [1957] WASH. U.L.Q. 282, 283 n.10.
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Communication
I I'
DEFAMATORY NOT DEFAMATORYIII
PRINTED, WRITTEN, ETC. ORAL N o cause
(Libel) (Slander) of action
I I I I I
Defamatory Defamatory Defamatory Defamatory
on face when on face when extrinsic
extrinsic facts knowvn
facts known
- I I
No I I
comparable CRIME NONE
classification DISEASE or
I BUSINESS, ETC. THESEI UNCHASTITY
Special damages I Special damages
never required Special damages must be pleaded &
never required proved1
(b) Criteria
Through an accident of historical development,14 defamation itself
was not made a separate tort but was divided into the two torts of
libel and slander. The distinction between them, the first criterion
by which communications were classified after they had been deter-
mined to be defamatory, was purely one of form: libel was written,
slander was oral, defamation.15 Thus the torts were merely different
causes of action awarded for the same wrong, viz., causing injury to
the reputation of another.
Secondly, the common law classified injurious words on the basis of
what they appeared to say. This was because any defamatory com-
munication, whether written (libel), or oral (slander), could be
formulated in either of two ways: (1) it could be defamatory on its
face, such as the words "You are a thief"; or (2) it could be osten-
sibly harmless but become defamatory when extrinsic facts were
known. An example of the latter alternative would be the statement
"John and Mary Jones are the parents of a son born yesterday,"
13. Criteria for categories which were relevant to the question of pleading and
proving damages are shown in SMALL AND LARGE CAPITAL LETTERS. Consequences
of the classifications are shown in italics. Factors irrelevant to the question of
damage are shown in roman type.
14. RESTATEMENT § 568, comment b; PROSSER § 92 at 573. See Van Vechten
Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLum. L. REv. 546
(1903).
15. PROSSER § 93. With the advent of modern methods of communication, the
distinction has become less clear. See Comment, supra note 12.
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when, in fact, John and Mary Jones have been married less than one
month.
Finally, because of the same historical accident that divided def-
amation into libel and slander, the common law further classified
slanders, but not libels, into two subcategories. Into one of these were
placed all slanders which: (1) charged plaintiff with a serious crime;
(2) charged him with having a loathsome disease; (3) affected him
n his business, trade, profession or office; or (4) charged a woman
with unchastitY1 Lumped together in the other category were all
slanders not having one of these four characteristics.
(e) Conse(ujznces
Although the initial classification of defamations into libels and
slanders was based on a strictly formal distinction, the consequences
of this classification were significant. If the defamation was con-
veyed in libelous form, plaintiff recovered merely by showing he had
been defamed, as the consequence of classifying a defamation libel
was a conclusive presumption that damage had occurred.17
The consequence of classifying a defamation slander depended upon
which subcategory of slander the defamation fell within, applying
the third criterion discussed above. The consequence of classifying it
in that subcategory containing imputations of crime, disease, etc.,
was a conclusive presumption that damage had occurred.18 The con-
sequence of classifying it as a member of the other subcategory was
that "special damages" had to be pleaded and proved in order to re-
cover. Since "special damages" meant actual pecuniary loss, pleaded
in detail and proved precisely as pleaded,20 plaintiff understandably
had an easier time in that subcategory in which he was relieved of
pleading and proving special damages, or, of course, in libel, where
damage was always presumed.
The second criterion-whether the words were defamatory on their
face or only when extrinsic facts were known-was important solely
in relation to pleading. If the words, whether in the form of a libel,
or of a slander of either category, were apparently innocent, or were
capable of more than one construction, plaintiff was required in his
pleading: (1) to set out the facts which, when known, made the words
defamatory (called the "inducement") ; (2) to state the defamatory
meaning of the words revealed by the inducement (called the "in-
nuendo") ; and (3) to show that the words referred to the plaintiff
(called the "colloquium").--°
16. Pa,§ssur § 93.
17, 1;.; RESTATEMENT § 569.
18. Pazossc § 93.
19. MCCoRmicK, DA'MAGES §§ 114-15 (1935) (hereafter AcCOR IcK). See
21. PfzossEa § 92, at 582-83.
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(d) Summary
The foregoing analysis points up the following features of the com-
mon law: (1) if a communication was defamatory, it had to be either
a libel or a slander, since there was no such thing as a defamation
which was neither slanderous nor libelous ;21 (2) every libel gave rise
to a presumption that damage had occurred; (3) certain slanders also
gave rise to a presumption of damage; (4) the fact that this category
of slander had the same consequence as libel should not cause con-
fusion between the two, for the criteria applied to determine them
were entirely different: the form of the publication in libel, the nature
of the imputation in slander; (5) other slanders required the plaintiff
to plead and prove special damages as a necessary element of his case;
(6) the consequences stated in (2), (3) and (5) were entirely in-
dependent of the classification of words into those that were or were
not defamatory on their face.
II. TERMINOLOGY AND CONFUSION
(a) At Common Law
In order to facilitate the use of its categories of defamation, the
common law affixed labels to them. The words "libel" and "slander"
are themselves labels for two categories of a common injury. This
point is a difficult one to grasp, possibly because the two were made
separate torts which together constituted the protection given for the
same injury, harm to one's reputation, rather than separate forms
of the same tort, defamation. 22 Concerning the second classification
previously discussed, when a written communication was defamatory
on its face the common law labelled it "libel per se" 23 as a shorthand
method of saying the pleading was not required to contain an induce-
ment, innuendo and colloquium. For the same purposes, "slander
per se" was applied to obviously defamatory oral communications.
Finally, slanders giving rise to a presumption of damage, i.e., those
imputing crime, disease, etc., were called "actionable per se."'24
In recent years, courts have become confused by this common law
terminology. This confusion stems from two deficiencies in the terms.
First, they all end with "per se." This led courts to treat the terms
21. See note 9 supra..
22. The fact that the same language may have different consequences depend-
ing upon whether it is written (libel) or spoken (slander) obscures the fact that
the two torts involve the same kind of injury to the same interest.
23. The terminology attributed to the common law follows PRossE c. 19. Since
the purposes of this section are: (1) to show how confusion can result from the
use of these labels, and (2) to demonstrate that this confusion adversely affects
the law, no attempt has been made to verify the common law meanings of the
terms.
24. The term "actionable per se" was sometimes applied to all defamations,
whether libels or slanders, giving rise to a presumption of damage. McCoRmicxc§§ 22, 113; RESTATEMENT § 569, comment c.
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as interchangeable and to apply them to different categories than the
common law courts did, thus causing confusion between the terms
themselves. Secondly, the terms were used indiscriminately as labels
sometimes for the criteria and sometimes for the consequences of the
categories to which they were applied. Thus the term "actionable per
se" was used to denote both the criterion by which a subclassification
of slanders was made and the consequence which resulted from mak-
ing it. The importance of the confusion becomes apparent when it is
recognized that rules of defamation are usually phrased so that the
meaning of the rule depends upon the common law term it contains:
"Unless the words are actionable per se, the plaintiff is required to
plead and prove special damages." If the court mistakes the meaning
of "actionable per se," it is likely to misinterpret or misapply the rule.
Thus, because their meanings determine the content of the rules that
contain them, confusion in the use of the terms has two pernicious
effects upon the law of defamation: (1) it works changes in the law
which are inadvertent and consequently of dubious value; (2) be-
cause the changes are inadvertent, the contents of the new rules are
often obscure and may be impossible to determine.
To illustrate how these two mistakes can combine to work a change
in the law, consider the following hypothetical case history. Suppose
a jurisdiction has a number of slander cases which state the rule: "If
the words are not actionable per se, special damage must be pleaded
and proved." Now suppose a defendant has printed a newspaper
article which is clearly defamatory of the plaintiff as a businessman.
The judge who writes the opinion affirming a judgment for the plain-
titr defines "actionable per se" to mean "giving rise to a presumption
of damage" and applies the term to all defamations, whether libels
or slanders, which have this consequence. In the course of his opinion
he says, "These words are libelous and actionable per se,"'2 5 meaning
that the words constituted a libel and therefore gave rise to a pre-
sumption of damage. The judge has correctly stated the common law
that all libels give rise to this presumption. Now suppose a subse-
( uent case arises involving exactly the same kind of a libel. Another
judge, less skilled in the law, says, "These words are actionable per
se [citing the last case] and therefore special damages need not be
alleged and proved [citing the slander cases]." Notice the first
judge used "actionable per se" in a way which denotes no one cate-
gory of defamations, but instead denotes the consequences attached
to two separate and distinct categories. Notice also that, as used in
the slander rule improperly applied to a libel case by the second judge,
"actionable per se" denotes only the criterion by which one category
27. See Hermann v. Bradstreet Co., 19 Mo. App. 227 (1885).
26. See litchell v. Bradstreet, 116 Mo. 226, 22 S.W. 358 (1893).
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of slanders is determined, i.e., whether the words imputed a crime,
disease, etc. Although the statement in the second case is a dictum,
it could subsequently be cited for either of two propositions: (1) that
special damages must sometimes be alleged and proved in libel suits;
(2) that there is a subclassification of libels comparable to that of
slanders. Both of these propositions are clearly contrary to the com-
mon law and the stage has inadvertently been set for a change. In
addition, the future development of the law still hinges upon the
meaning of "actionable per se" as used in the second case. Since this
meaning is not clear, the law has been rendered indefinite. Author-
ities disagree which common law term precipitated the confusion,"7
but they agree that misunderstood terminology was the ultimate
cause.
(b) In Missouri
The preceding discussion should make the significance of the fol-
lowing summary of Missouri cases obvious. As will be shown, such
confusion surrounds the use of the common law terms that Missouri
rules of defamation that contain them are nearly meaningless.2s The
term "actionable per se" has been used to mean: (1) that the words
gave rise to a presumption of damage ;29 (2) that the words were
defamatory on their face;30 (3) that the words were defamatory;31
(4) that the words charged the commission of a crime;32 and (5) the
same as "slander per se," which term was not defined.33 Seven
opinions use the term in two different senses without discrimina-
tion.34 The term "slander per se" has been used to mean: (1) the
27. PROSSER § 92 at 582 n.22 ("defamatory per se"); McComxicc § 113 ("ac-
tionable per se"); 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 5.9 at 373-74 n.9 (1956) ("slander
per se"). See generally Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 HARv. L. REv.
874, 889-91 (1956).
28. In the following summary, wherever it was impossible to determine the
meaning assigned to a term by the court, it was assumed the tern had been given
its proper common law denotation.
29. E.g., Bray v. Callihan, 155 Mo. 43, 55 S.W. 865 (1900) ; Browning v. Powers,
38 S.W. 943 (Mo. 1897); Barbee v. Hereford, 48 Mo. 323 (1871).
30. E.g., Connell v. A. C. L. Haase & Sons Fish Co., 302 Mo. 48, 257 S.W. 760
(1923); Carpenter v. Hamilton, 185 Mo. 603, 84 S.W. 863 (1904); Christal v.
Craig, 80 Mo. 367 (1883).
31. Heitzeberg v. Von Hoffmann Press, 340 Mo. 265, 100 S.W.2d 307 (1937);
Diener v. Star-Chronicle Publishing Co., 230 Mo. 613, 132 S.W. 1143 (1910).
32. McKim v. Moore, 291 Mo. 697, 237 S.W. 773 (1922); Fenn v. Kroger
Grocery & Baking Co., 209 S.W. 885 (Mo. 1919); Rauche v. Gas Service Co., 241
Mo. App. 976, 235 S.W.2d 420 (1950).
33. Carpenter v. Hamilton, 185 Mo. 603, 84 S.W. 863 (1904).
34. Fensky v. Maryland Cas. Co., 264 Mo. 154, 174 S.W. 416 (1915) (giving
rise to a presumption of damage and defamatory on face); Carpenter v. Hamilton
185 Mo. 603, 84 S.W. 863 (1904) (same as "slander per se" [undefined] and
defamatory on face); Elfrank v. Seller, 54 Mo. 134 (1873) (giving rise to a
presumption of damage and defamatory on face) ; Atterbury v. Brink's Express
Co., 90 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. App. 1936) (same as "slander per se" [undefined] and
defamatory); Williams v. Turnbull, 232 S.W. 172 (Mo. App. 1921) (giving rise
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same as "actionable per se." which term was not defined ;3 (2) that
the words gave rise to a presumption of damage ;- (3) that the words
were defamatory on their face; - - (4) that the words charged the
co mmission of a crime; - and (5) that the words were defamatory.?
In five opinions that term was used to mean both that the words gave
rise to a presumption of damage and that they were defamatory on
their face.," The term "libel per se" has been used to mean: (1) that
the words were defamatory on their face ;, (2) that the words gave
rise to a presumption of damage ;4Z (3) that the words fell within the
statutory definition of criminal libel;43 (4) that the words were de-
famatory;' (5) that the words charged the commission of a crime;-
(6) that the words imputed whatever they imputed to plaintiff ;41 and
(7) the same as "actionable per se," which term was not defined.47
It can hardly be denied that such confusion is deplorable. If the
utilization of common law terminology effected any considerable sav-
ings of time or space it could perhaps be justified. But is it so much
more difficult to say that words are "defamatory on their face" than
to say they constitute "slander per se"? Are the four words saved by
tagging a defamation "actionable per se," instead of "giving rise to
a presumption of damage," worth the confusion? It is submitted the
t,, a p, esumption of damage and defamatory on face); Haynes v. Robertson, 190
Mo, A1p. 15, 175 S.W. 290 (1915) (same); Roney v. Organ, 176 Mo. App. 234,
1!;1 S.W. 868 (1913) (same).
35. Attcrbury v. Brink's Express Co., sapra note 34; Carpenter v. Hamilton,
ii pet iiotc 31; Baldvin v. Boulware, 79 Mo. App. 5 (1899).
: :. E.g., Lightfoot v. Jennings, :363 Mo. 878, 254 S.W.2d 596 (1953); Orchard
v. Globe Printing Co., 240 Mo. 575, 144 S.W. 812 (1912); Ukman v. Daily Record
(o, lS1 Mo. 3is, SS S.W. 60 (1905).
'7. E.., Stote fC /e. Hairiman v. Re nolds, 273 Mo. 131, 200 S.W. 296 (1917);
Caqieiiiite v. Hamilton, 185 Mo. 603, 84 S.W. 863 (1904); Hudson v. Garner,
22 Mo. J423 (1856).
-8. Krup v. CorTey, 95 Mo. App. 640, 69 S.W. 609 (1902).
:1!) Konz v. Hartwig, 151 Mo. App. 94, 131 S.W. 721 (1910).
1o. Ball v. Adkins, 59 Mo. 144 (1875); Haynes v. Robertson, 190 no. App. 156,
175 S.W. 290 (1915); Ciandall v. Greeves, 181 Mo. App. 235, 168 S.W. 264 (1914);
rnnj .- v. Henry, 177 Mo. App. 329, 164 S.W. 241 (1914); Michael v. Matheis,
77 Mo. App. 556 (1893).
41, E.q., Childers v. Nesselroad, 357 Mo. 1218, 212 S.W.2d 727 (1948); Connell
v A. C. L. Haase & Sons Fish Co., 302 Mo. 48, 257 S.W. 760 (1923); Cook v. Globe
I' ,nlint Co., 227 Mo. 471, 127 S.W. 332 (1910).
12. E.g., Creekmore v. Runnels, 359 Mo. 1020, 224 S.W.2d 1007 (1949); Eby v.
Wi , o 1, 315 Mo. 1214, 289 S.W. 639 (1926) ; Jones v. Murray, 167 Mo. 25, 66 S.W.
J4. Coots v. Payton, 365 Mo. 180, 280 S.W.2d 47 (1955); Seested v. Post Print-
& Pablishin Co., 326 Mo. 559, 31 S.W.2d 1045 (1930); Conrad v. Allis-Jhm, s M.f . Co)., 228 Mo. App. 817, 73 S.W.2d 438 (1934).
44. E.a., Coots v. Payton, q'lprcf note 43; Moritz v. Kansas City Star Co., 364
Mo. 822, 259 S.W.2d 583 (1953); Furlong v. German-American Press Ass'n., 189
S W. :8x5 (Mo. 1916).
F5. Mt,*e v, p7,,: Zoin v. Cox. 318Mo 112 298 S.W. 837 (19 7).
V,. McWilliams V. Wolkers' Printing Co., 188 Mo. App. 504, 174 S.W. 464
17. 3P,,3, ovm v. Publishers: George Knapp & Co. 213 M o. 655, 112 S.W. 474
1IS) Mitchell '. Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226, 22 §.W. 358 (1893).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss4/2
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
answer to both questions is an emphatic "No." Furthermore, when
the use of these terms results in changes in the law which are inad-
vertent rather than deliberate, and in rules which are meaningless
symbols to attorneys and judges seeking guidance in the administra-
tion of justice, it is submitted that their use could never be justified.
In order to avoid this confusion, the following terminology has
been, and will be, used throughout this note: (1) concerning the dis-
tinction between obviously defamatory and apparently harmless com-
munications, "defamatory on its face" will be used to denote the
criterion and "must plead inducement, innuendo and colloquium" to
refer to the consequence; these terms will be applied to libels and slan-
ders alike, since the criterion is the same and the consequence the
same in both torts; (2) "gives rise to a presumption of damage" will
be used to denote (a) the consequence of classifying a defamation a
libel, and (b) the consequence of classifying a slander as one in which
the plaintiff is not required to plead and prove special damages; (3)
no term will be assigned to the criterion by which the subclassification
of slanders is made, because no term is available which can clearly
be distinguished from the term that refers to the consequence of the
same classification.
III. THE REQUIREMENT OF SPECIAL DAMAGES IN LIBEL
Turning now to specific Missouri problems, the one most clearly
ascribable to the general confusion in terminology is the question
whether special damages need ever be pleaded and proved in a libel
suit. It has been said that they must.48 As has been pointed out, how-
ever, the common law always presumed damage in libel actions and
the plaintiff recovered merely by showing he had been defamed. 4 The
purpose of this section is to isolate the source, trace the history, and
determine the present validity, of this deviation from the common
law.
(a) History of the Requirement
Missouri's deviation appears to stem from two kinds of cases. In
order to understand the first of these, it will be necessary to study
Hermann v. Bradstreet Co.,50 an appellate court opinion cited by the
Missouri Supreme Court as authority for its initial departure from
the common law. In the Hermann case, a business man sued for libel
because of. a newspaper article reading "Joseph Hermann, brick-
maker, is in the hands of the sheriff." In reversing a judgment for
plaintiff on grounds not material here, the court said that the imputa-
48. E.g., Creekmore v. Runnels, 359 Mo. 1020, 224 S.W.2d 1007 (1949).
49. Text at note 17 supra.
50. 19 Mo. App. 227 (1885). Unless otherwise specified, this note deals only
with Missouri Supreme Court decisions.
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tion of bankruptcy to a businessman was libelous and actionable per
se.", The court was using the term "actionable per se" to mean giving
rise to a presumption of damage," for it went on to say that special
damages were not essential in a libel suit,- a correct statement of the
common law.
In Mitchell ty. Brad1street Co., " however, the language quoted above
was cited as authority for the following:
it is next contended that the publication was not libelous per
.!xe, and that therefore it was necessary for plaintiffs to allege...
and also prove special damages before being entitled to recover.
If the libel complained of is not actionable per se then defen-
dant's position is correct, otherwise not25
It is not clear what the court in the Mitchell case thought "actionable
per se" meant, but it is clear (1) that the court was incorrect in say-
ing that special damages sometimes were required in libel cases, (2)
that the Herzann case did not support the proposition for which it
was cited, and (3) that the Mitchell case used the term as denoting
a criterion of some sort whereas the Hermann case had used it to
denote a consequence.
The second type of case serving as a source for the special damage
requirement in libel suits is well illustrated by the court's next de-
parture from the common law. In St. James Military Academy v.
Ga c,, decided the year after the Mitchell case, the defendants had
accused plaintiff-owners of operating an "immoral school." A judg-
ment sustaining a demurrer was reversed by the court, which said:
Words which on the face of them when falsely published of a
party in connection with his trade or profession, must necessarily
injure him with respect thereto, or which directly tend to the
prejudice of such person in his trade or business, are actionable
in themselves without p'oof of special damages.57
This quotation demonstrates how special damages language can be
imported from slander into libel cases when there is an overlapping
of consequences betveen the torts.5 To illustrate, suppose that a
communication identical to that in the St. James case is sued upon in
both libel and slander and no special damages are pleaded. The de-
fendant in each case demurs to the petition. The petition in the St.
Ja ninc case would be sufficient in either libel or slander, but for differ-
ent reasons: in libel because the words were defamatory, hence li-
belous, and thus giving rise to a presumption of damage; in slander
,1. hI at 232.
Y2. See note 24 and text at notes 25-26 .mpra.
tJ 1 Mo. App. at 23'3.
4. 116 Mo. 226, 22 S.W. 358 (1893).b5. 1. at 240-41, 22 S.W. at 36.3.
36. 125 Mo. 517, 28 S.W. 851 (1894).
57. Id. at 525, 28 S.W. at 852. (Emphasis added.)
5S. See text following note 21 sipra.
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because the words (1) were defamatory, and (2) fell within that
category of slanders relieving the plaintiff of the necessity of pleading
and proving special damages. Thus the consequence is the same in
both instances: the petition is sufficient without alleging special
damages. But if a court consistently looks at slander cases to deter-
mine the sufficiency of petitions in libel suits, it would seem inevitable
that sooner or later special damages language would be introduced
where it had no place. This is what happened in the St. James case.
Notice that the quotation is a correct statement of the common law
of libel if the words in italics, viz., "without proof of special dam-
ages," are omitted. The case only implies, of course, that special dam-
ages are sometimes required in libel actions. But when this implica-
tion is added to statements like that in the Mitchell case, the possi-
bility of future error is undoubtedly enhanced. Missouri has a line of
cases with just such implications . It is perhaps significant that the
same judge wrote the opinions in both the Mitchell and the St. James
cases.
Disregarding, henceforth, libel cases which misuse slander opinions
because of an overlapping of consequences like that discussed above,0o
the next case stating that certain libels required an allegation and
proof of special damages was Furlong v. German-American Press
Ass'n.,61 decided in 1916. The interesting feature of this decision is
that, except for its final paragraph, it is entirely devoted to a finding
that the communication complained of was not defamatory. After so
finding, the court gratuitously adds, "The publication not being li-
belous per se, and no special damages being alleged ... , no cause of
59. See, e.g., Walsh v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 250 Mo. 142, 157 S.W. 326(1913) ; Cook v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 241 Mo. 326, 145 S.W. 480 (1912).
The mistake of cross-citing libel and slander cases without analyzing the differ-
ent problems involved also has another unfortunate effect. For example, suppose
a slander charging that plaintiff "cheated" another. If no special damages are
alleged, a demurrer presents two questions: (1) are the words defamatory, and
(2) do they charge plaintiff with the commission of a crime, i.e., do they give
rise to a presumption of damage? In order to save time, the court will probably
deal only with the second question, answer it in the negative, and sustain the
demurrer. Now suppose the same words are sued upon in libel. The question
presented by demurrer is: are the words defamatory? This is obviously a different
question than, Do the words charge a crime? Nevertheless, Missouri courts in
such a situation have sometimes used slander cases as authority for determining
the sufficiency of a petition in libel and have thus implied that a communication
must charge a crime to be defamatory. See, e.g., State ex rel. Zorn v. Cox, 318 Mo.
112, 298 S.W. 837 (1927). For an opinion displaying an inexplicable refusal to
analyze the different problems, see Sullivan v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
337 Mo. 1084, 88 S.W.2d 167 (1935).
60. E.g., the cases cited in note 59 supra. Also ignored are cases such as
Flowers v. Smith, 214 Mo. 98, 112 S.W. 499 (1908), which merely repeats the
dictum in the Mitchell case without apparent reason; Ukman v. Daily Record Co.,
189 Mo. 378, 88 S.W. 60 (1905), an example of confusion which rephrases correct
common law statements and changes their meanings completely, and Orchard v.
Globe Printing Co., 240 Mo. 575, 144 S.W. 812 (1912) which repeats these errors.
61. 189 S.W. 385 (Mo. 1916).
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action was stated."02 The authority cited is the Mitchel case. Two
things are noteworthy: (1) the term used in stating that special
damages may be required has changed from "actionable per se" in
the Mitchell case to "libel per se"; (2) from the location of the state-
ment, it could be contended the case holds that non-defamatory words,
i.c., non-"Iibelous per se," give rise to an action for libel if they cause
special damage. That this would truly be an abrupt departure from
the common law needs hardly be stated.9
Ten years after the Furlong case, Eby v. Wis8on6 came before the
court, Jn this case a letter was sent by a bank to the purchaser of an
automobile stating that the bank held an outstanding mortgage on
the cur. Holding that this defamed plaintiff-dealers, the court said:
The primary, question in this case is whether plaintiffs are
entitled to recover general damages. . . The determination of
that question turns upon the class to which the alleged libel be-
lo gs, and whether the writing was libelous per se, in the sense
in which that term is used. Courts and writers of text-books have
divided defamatory words into two classes: Those which are said
to be libelous per se. for which general damages may be re-
covered, and those designated libelous per quod, and on account
of" w.hich special damages only are recoverable, and then only be-
cause alleged and proved.7
It is a curious fact that the court cited no Missouri cases for this
proposition, but relied instead upon Corpus Juris36 and Ruling Case
La,,,Z Neither authority supports the proposition. In the first place,
the court substituted "libel per se" for the "actionable per se" used in
both treatises and used by both to mean giving rise to a presumption
of damage. Secondly, while it is true that neither authority points
out, on the pages cited by the court, that all libels would be "action-
able per se" as it defines the term, both do so later. s
Finally, in 1949, the court decided C(reekmore v. Runnels. The
case is strikingly similar to the Furlong case in that the court devotes
almost the entire opinion to a determination that the communication
was not defamatory, and then concludes:
[ilt may not be said that the charge.., is in and of itself...
defamnatory .... [I] in the absence of an allegation of some spe-
cial loss or injury, it may not be said that the general charge of
"heresy" ... is libelous and actionable per se.7
Id. ~t at .390.
e. 5c note 9, and text at notes 9-11 supra.
1; . 21 15 Mo. 1214, 289 S.W. 639 (1926).
1;5. It . at 1222, 289 S.W. at 642.
6. :f; C.J., Lbc & Slander § 17 (1924).
617. 17 R.C.L., Libel & Slander § 4 (1917).
68. 17 ;. § 26; 36 C.J., Libel & Slander § 28 (1924).
Te court also committed the error discussed in the St. James case by using a
Missouri slander case, Ranunell v. Otis, 60 Mo. 365 (1875), as a guide for its dis-
cussion of the sufficiency of the petition. See note 59 supra.
. ::59 Mo. 1020, 224 S.W.2d 1007 (1949).
70. Id. at 1025, 224 S.W,2d at 1009.
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Notice, however, that the term used is again "actionable per se." The
court cited no authority for the statement.
A review of the cases stating that special damages must sometimes
be alleged and proved in libel cases shows that the statement: was
first made as a dictum, since the court held the petition sufficient
against demurrer, in a case misconstruing precedent; next appeared
as a dictum, since the court held that the words were not defamatory,
in a case relying upon the first statement; appeared for the third time
as a dictum, since the court held the petition good against demurrer,
in a case which relied upon authority not supporting it; and finally
appeared as a dictum, since the court held the words not defamatory,
in a case citing no authority for it whatsoever. Thus the validity of
the proposition in Missouri depends upon four unsupported dicta and
a line of cases indiscriminately importing slander rules into libel
cases.
(b) The Nature of Special Damages
Before attempting to draw conclusions from the preceding discus-
sion, it will be necessary at this point to examine briefly the nature of
the special damages required to be pleaded and proved. "Special" is
the term used to designate four separate kinds of damage: (1) those
required to be pleaded and proved in certain defamation cases; (2)
those resulting from breach of contract vhich were not foreseeable
when the contract was executed, and hence not recoverable; (3)
those which, although they were caused by the defendant's tortious
act, are so unusual that they must be pleaded in order to warn the
defendant what he must be prepared to meet at the trial; (4) those
which must be proved, e.g., pain and suffering, as opposed to those
which are presumed to have occurred from the injury, e.g., nominal
damages in trespass. 71 At common law, as applied to defamation
cases, special damages meant actual pecuniary loss, pleaded in detail
and proved as pleaded.72 In the only Missouri case ever considering
the question at length,73 "special damages" in defamation cases were
defined as follows:
Special, as contradistinguished from general, damage, is that
which is the natural, but not the necessary consequence of the act
complained of.7 4
In other words, they were defined in the same way as those damages
which are required to be pleaded in order to allow the defendant to
prepare his case. This holding is, of course, contrary to the common
law.7 5
71. MCCORMICK § 8 at 32-33 n.3.
72. Id. at §§ 114-15. Accord, Curry v. Collins, 37 Mo. 324 (1866).
73. Friedman v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 102 Mo. App. 683, 77 S.W. 340 (1903).
74. Id. at 694, 77 S.W. at 343. Accord, Hermann v. Bradstreet Co., 19 Mo. App.
227 (1885).
75. Missouri cases giving more accurate but brief indications of the nature of
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It has been said by the Missouri Supreme Court that special dam-
ages must sometimes be alleged and proved in libel cases. The va-
lidity of this requirement is open to serious question because the re-
quirement rests upon four unsupported dicta and a line of eases
obviously confusing the rules governing the separate torts of libel and
slander. But assuming for the moment that the requirement does
exist, two questions remain to be answered: (1) what are its effects
on the law; (2) in which libel suits must special damages be pleaded?
These questions will be taken up in inverse order.
Determining the types of libels requiring special damages depends
first upon a statement of the rule. Is it "Unless the words are action-
able per se, special damages must be pleaded and proved" as would be
indicated by two cases, or is it "Unless the words are libelous per se,
special damages must be pleaded and proved" as indicated by two
others? If it is the former, which of the five meanings of "actionable
per se"' 0 is to be applied? If it is the latter, which of the seven mean-
ings or "libel per se'"' is to be applied? And notice the meaning given
"special damages." It could be contended facetiously, but logically,
that the rule of the Ci eekm ore and Furlong cases is this: Unless the
words are defamatory, plaintiff is required to plead and prove he
suffered unexpected and unusual injury because of them. Or, con-
versely: If plaintiff can prove that he suffered unusual or unexpected
injury because of a communication, he has an action for libel even
though the communication was not defamatory. But other Missouri
cases are contrary.7s "Libel per se" has also been used to mean any
communication falling within the terms of the statute defining crimi-
nal libel.7;' Injuries to business are not mentioned by the statute. The
rule as to businessmen then would be: If the natural and probable
consequence of the communication is to injure business, no cause of
action arises; but if a communication causes unusual or unexpected
injury, a cause of action does arise but the injury must be pleaded
special damages are: Laughlin v. Laughlin, 232 S.W. 114 (Mo. 1921) (inability
to borrow money is special damage): Burrows v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 255
S.W. 925 (Mo. App. 1923) (inability to find work is general damage); Anderson
v. Shockley, 159 Mo. App. 334, 140 S.W. 7.55 (1911) (injured feelings are general
damage); Brown v. Wintch, 110 Mo. App. 264, 84 S.W. 196 (1904) (same);
Baldwin %. Boulware, 79 Mo. App. 5 (1899) (same). Compare Baldwin v. Walser,
41 Mo. App. 243 (1890) (loss of customers, loss of business, reduced commercial
standing, are special damages) and Legg v. Dunlevy, 10 Mo. App. 461 (1881)
(general allegation of loss of business is sufficient averment of special damage)
witb Spurlock v. Lombard Investment Co., 59 Mo. App. 225 (1894) (loss of credit
and business pleaded; held: special damage was not pleaded).
70. See text at notes 29-33 supra.
77. See text. at notes 41-47 supra.
78 E.,, Walsh v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 250 Mo. 142, 157 S.W. a26 (1913).
79. Cases cited note 43 supra.
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and proved. And if this is the case, must the communication be de-
famatory?
It is submitted these speculations point up the futility of attempting
to determine the meaning of a rule couched in such ambiguous terms.
At present, the libels, if any, requiring that special damages be
pleaded and proved cannot be delineated. Whether or not such a re-
quirement exists, the effect of the cases discussed in this section is
to unsettle the law and disable it from performing one of its functions
as a guide to attorneys and judges. If the requirement is held to be
valid, its secondary effect is to change the common law. In itself, this
is not necessarily bad, since the common law must remain flexible
enough to meet the varying needs of a developing society.80 It is sub-
mitted, however, that the changes discussed above were inadvertent
and therefore not directed toward improvement of the law. It is be-
yond the scope of this note to argue for or against the requirement of
special damages in libel ;81 if the court desires to impose the require-
ment, it has the undoubted power to do so. But it is believed that the
reasons for such a requirement should be clearly stated by the court in
order that lawyers, judges, and legal scholars, may be apprised of the
ends to be achieved.
IV. THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTION
In addition to the requirement of special damages in libel, two other
problems have recurred so frequently in the Missouri cases that their
solution would seem to be a condition precedent to improving the law.
The first of these is raised by the constitutional provision that:
[I] n suits and prosecutions for libel the jury, under the direc-
tions of the court, shall determine the law and the facts.82
Borrowed from Fox's Libel Act, 3 which was passed by Parliament to
curb the power of English judges in prosecutions for criminal libel,84
this provision has appeared in every Missouri constitution since the
original one of 1820.85 Although the constitution does not limit the
provision to prosecutions, the statute implementing it does,80 thereby
80. See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 354-6, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951).
81. For reasons adequately presented in Comment, supra note 12, at 291-92,
the writers believe that it would be better to impose the rules of libel upon slander
rather than vice versa.
82. Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 8. (Emphasis added.)
83. 32 GEO. 3, c. 60.
84. Jacobs v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 358 Mo. 674, 216 S.W.2d
523, 527 (1948). Other discussions of the origin and purpose of Missouri's con-
stitutional provision can be found in Ukman v. Daily Record Co., 189 Mo. 378,
80 S.W. 60 (1905) and Heller v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 153 Mo. 205, 54 S.W.
457 (1899).
85. MO. CONST. art. 13, § 16 (1820); MO. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (1865); Mo.
CONST. art. 2, § 14 (1875).
86. MO. REV. STAT. § 559.440 (1949) reads: "In all prosecutions for libel ...
the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the fact."(Emphasis added.)
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recognizing its criminal origin, But whatever its origin and purpose,
and in spite of the limitation of the statute, the provision has been
applied to civil cases- and for a considerable period caused conflict
and confusion, some of which still exists. In determining the effect of
the provision today, jury determinations of law will be treated first
and will be followed by relatively brief summaries of jury determina-
tions of fact and the conclusiveness of jury verdicts. Problems con-
terning directed verdicts will be discussed before the conclusion.
The contention that the jury should determine the law in libel cases
was first raised in a criminal case in 1885. In rejecting the conten-
t ion, the supreme court pointed out the words "under the directions of
the court" and held that the jury must be guided by the court's in-
structions and not by what it determined the law to be. Just nine
years later, however, the court approved an instruction in a civil suit
telling the jury it could disregard the cour's directions and determine
the law as it saw fit.c" Five years thereafter an instruction that the
jury w.as the "sole judge of law and fact" was approved." By 1907
the court had begun to retreat from this position by holding that the
jury'a determination of the law was conclusive provided it had been
properly instructed in the law2n And in 1909, the court returned to
its approximate starting point by saying that all matters of law were
Cor the judge to decide. -, This attitude was reaffirmed eight years
later when the court held erroneous an instruction permitting the jury
to disregard the court's directions and stated that the jury must be
guided by the instructions of the cou-tr z Since that time the question
has never been seriously contested and seems now to be settIed *
The conclusiveness of jury fact determinations is more doubtful. It
has been said that a jury verdict for plaintiff conclusively settles the
question of malice on a plea of qualified privilege21 But it has also
heenf said that a jury verdict for plaintiff is reversible outright when
the evidence of express malice does not satisfy the court." In at least
three cases the court has reversed plaintiffs' verdicts because the facts
87. E.g., Brown v. Globe Printing Co., 213 Mo. 611, 112 S.W. 462 (1908).
88. State x. Hosmer, 85 Mo. 553 (1885).
89. Arnold v. Jewett, 125 Mo. 241, 28 S.W. 614 (1894).
90. BleClosky v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 152 Mo. 339, 53 S.W. 1087 (1899).
91. Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. S5, 107 S.W. 496 (M).
92. Branch ,. Publishers: George Knapp & Co., 222 Mfo. 580, 121 S.W. 93
(i1909.
93. Leedy v .Wolf, 199 S.W. 1002 (Mlo. 1917).
94. Bt see Fitch v. Star-Times Publishing Co., 263 S.W.2d $2 (Mo. 1953)
where, thirty-six years after the debate had seemingly been laid to rest, the court
used the provislon to dispose of an apparently frivolous appeal
%5. Brown v. Globe Printing Co., 213 Mo, 611,112 S.W. 462 (1008).
90. Tilles v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 241 Mo. 609, 145 SW. I14 (1912),
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conclusively showed the defamations were true, 7 and in one case the
court reversed a verdict for defendant, apparently as being against
the weight of the evidence.05 That a general jury verdict as such is not
conclusive in spite of what the constitution appears to say is shown
by the fact that on at least five occasions the court has adverted to the
provision and reversed a verdict in the same opinion. 9 Still, the pro-
vision has been used at least once as an excuse for affirming a jury
verdict which appeared legally dubious.100
Remaining to be discussed is the problem whether the provision
prohibits the judge from directing a verdict for the plaintiff. The
question first arose in Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co.,101 where a verdict
directed for the plaintiff was affirmed. Six years later, however, in
Heller v. Pulitzer Publishing Co.,1 2 a directed verdict for the plaintiff
was reversed, the court saying that a judge could not direct for plain-
tiff under the constitutional provision. The Mitchell case was distin-
guished on the ground that there the defendant had not requested an
instruction telling the jury that it was sole judge of the law and
fact. 03 The Heller case has been followed,04 however, and appears to
state the law as it stands today.
In summary, then, the constitutional provision seems to be without
effect, except on the question whether a verdict can be directed for the
plaintiff. According to the latest decisions,1°5 the jury applies the law,
obtained from the court's instructions, to the facts. 00 This appears
to be not only a statement of the rule normally applicable to civil
suits, but also all that the express language of the constitution ever
required. It appears that jury fact determinations are conclusive un-
97. McClung v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 279 Mo. 370, 214 S.W. 193 (1919);
McClung v. Star-Chronicle Publishing Co., 274 Mo. 194, 202 S.W. 571 (1918);
Cook v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 241 Mo. 326, 145 S.W. 480 (1912). See also
Tilles v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., supra note 96.
98. Cf. Jones v. Murray, 167 Mo. 25, 66 S.W. 981 (1901).
99. Leedy v. Wolf, 199 S.W. 1002 (Mo. 1917); Cook v. Pulitzer Publishing Co.,
241 Mo. 326, 145 S.W. 480 (1912); Branch v. Publishers: George Knapp & Co.,
222 Mo. 580, 121 S.W. 93 (1909); Jones v. Murray, supra note 98; McClosky v.
Publitzer Publishing Co., 152 Mo. 339, 53 S.W. 1087 (1899).
100. See Brown v. Globe Printing Co., 213 Mo. 611, 112 S.W. 462 (1908) where
the defendant, alleging the article was a verbatim extract of a court record,
pleaded privilege. The court said: "By their verdict the jury in effect found that
the article was a libel. If libelous, it follows that the publication was not privi-
leged." Id. at 646, 112 S.W. at 471. Cf. note 94 supra.
101. 116 Mo. 226, 22 S.W. 358 (1893).
102. 153 Mo. 205, 54 S.W. 457 (1899).
103. Id. at 213-15, 54 S.W. at 459.
104. E.g., Lee v. W. E. Futterer Battery & Supplies Co., 323 Mo. 1204, 23
S.W.2d 45 (1929) (dictum); Diener v. Star-Chronicle Publishing Co., 230 Mo.
613, 132 S.W. 1143 (1910) (dictum).
105. This summary is predicated on the assumption that the most recent case
properly states the law. But see §§ V & VI (a) infra; text at notes 88-96 and
note 100 supra.
106. See text at notes 92-93 supra.
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less clearly against the weight of the evidence,0 z again the normal
rule. It should be noted that these conclusions rest upon what the
court does in fact and not upon the language of the opinions. The
cases imply that the provision changes the rules normally applicable
to civil suits. Thus it is usually said that "the jury determines the
law under the directions of the court" rather than "the jury applies
the law obtained fromw the court's instructions."1Qs If the court in fact
applies the normal civil rules, the question arises why it cannot direct
a verdict for plaintiff in a libel"" suit, for it has consistently held that
it can direct a verdict for the defendant."1 To support its conclusion
that a plaintiff's verdict cannot be directed, the court reasons that the
purpose of Fox's Libel Act, which served as a model for the provision,
was to prevent a judge from directing the jury to find that the de-
fendant had committed a criminal libel. It then concludes that the
provision should be given the same effect in a civil suit.' Since the
constitution clearly makes the provision applicable to civil suits, this
is probably as sensible a conclusion as can be reached. By requiring
the jury to adhere to the court's instructions on the law, by retaining
the power to overturn jury findings of fact that are against the weight
of the evidence, and by upholding the power to direct verdicts for de-
fendants, the court has refused to effectuate the constitution's literal
language and has thus avoided utter chaos. If it were also to claim
the power to direct plaintiffs' verdicts, the provision would have no
effect whatever on civil litigation. Since this clearly is contrary to the
intent of the framers, the position taken by the court seems to be an
adequate compromise between two impossible extremes.
V. THE CRIMINAL LIBEL STATUTE
In vivid contrast to its adroit disposition of the anachronistic con-
stitinal provision stands the court's handling of a problem of its own
c-eation, viz., that arising from the decision to apply Missouri's crim-
inal libel statute to civil litigation. To begin with, it is doubtful
107. Tilles v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 241 Mo. 609, 145 S.W. 1143 (1912);
Cook v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 241 Mo. 326, 145 S.W. 480 (1912).
108. See, e.g., Cook v. Globe Printing Co., 227 Mo. 471, 541, 127 S.W. 332, 352(1101) where it is said, "... on the main issue of libel or no libel, the jury are
the judges of both law and fact ... ." In all other questions, libel is like any-
thing else.
10,11. The prohibition has consistently been said not to apply to slander suits.
See, eg, HelIer v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 153 Mo. 205, 54 S.W. 457 (1899)(dictum).
I10. E.g., Diener v. Star-Chronicle Publishing Co., 230 Mo. 613, 132 S.W. 1143
(I910). It seems, however, that the court retains the power to reverse a verdict
for the defendant and order a new trial, on the grounds that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence. Cf. Jones v. Murray, 167 Mo. 25, 66 S.W.
981 (1901).
111. See authorities cited in note 84 supra.
112. E.g., Hylsky v. Globe Democrat Publishing Co., 348 Mo. 83, 152 S.W.2d
1111 (1941).
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the statute was meant to be effective outside the criminal law, a fact
recognized by the first case raising the question.113 Nor has the court
ever attempted to show any necessity for applying it to civil suits.
Nevertheless, cases subsequent to the first have consistently held it
applicable and the effects of this ruling must be determined.
Appearing in substantially the same form1 4 as when enacted in
1879," 5 the statute provides:
A libel is the malicious defamation of a person made public by
any printing, writing, sign, picture, representation or effigy tend-
ing to provoke him to wrath or expose him to public hatred, con-
tempt or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public
confidence and social intercourse . . .
Inclusion of the word "defamation" has caused immense difficulty in
interpreting the statute. If the statute had read "publication about" in-
stead of "defamation of," it would have defined criminal libel the same
way the common law defined civil libel because it contains the two
common law criteria by which a publication was determined to be
libelous: (1) the criterion for determining whether it was defamatory
("tending to . . expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule") ; and
(2) the criterion for determining whether, if it was defamatory, it
was a libel as opposed to a slander ("printing, writing" etc.). But
since it does read "defamation of," it bears another possible meaning,
viz., that it selects some "defamations," which term it does not define,
and makes those having any of the enumerated effects, and published
in any of the specified ways, libels. 1 7 This interpretation, which will be
referred to as the "selected defamations" construction, would require
a search outside the statute to find the meaning of "defamation." But
the rest of the statute includes the entire scope of common law civil
libel, so that this interpretation would suggest an expansion of "def-
amation" beyond its common law meaning. What this larger mean-
ing could be is nowhere explained in the statute. Thus, if the "selected
defamations" construction is chosen, the statute provides no aid in
determining whether a given communication is defamatory.
Without taking the space necessary for a detailed chronology, the
court's solution to the problem can be stated briefly: it utilizes which-
ever interpretation permits it to reach that decision most congenial
113. McGinnis v. George Knapp & Co., 109 Mo. 131, 18 S.W. 1134 (1892).
114. In the 1939 revision, the statute was changed from "A libel is a malicious
defamation . . . ." to "A libel is the malicious defamation . . . ." The statute is
otherwise the same as when enacted, except for the deletion of three commas.
The change in wording would appear to be inadvertent and without legal signifi-
cance.
115. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1591 (1879).
116. Mo. REy. STAT. § 559.410 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
117. See Coots v. Payton, 365 Mo. 180, 187, 280 S.W.2d 47, 53 (1955).
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to its sense of justice."' This course has resulted in conflicting and
inconsistent decisions, as will be demonstrated shortly. First, how-
ever, the question whether the two constructions are equally valid
will be considered in detail.
From the rather limited evidence available, it would seem that the
statute was meant to codify the common law definition of libel and
punish all communications thereby rendered libelous. As has been
pointed out, the phrase "expose to public hatred, contempt or ridicule'
is substantially that used by the old common law to designate defama-
tory communications.,' In addition, three of the phrases contained
in the statute parallel closely the language of two Missouri cases
decided prior to its enactment.'2 As a matter of fact, a large portion
of the statute is substantially an extract of an 1847 case which defined
a libel as follows:
[A] malicious publication, expressed either in printing or writ-
ine, or by signs or pictures, tending either to blacken the memory
of the dead, or the reputation of one who is alive, and exposed him
to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.121
Notice, however, that the case says "publication" where the statute
says "defamation." It is now impossible to determine whether the
dIraftsman's use of the word "defamation" was inadvertent, but it is
believed this assumption is at least as plausible as that which contends
the use was deliberate, particularly in view of the substantial changes
in the law caused by assuming the latter. For, disregarding the simi-
larity of language between the statute and the common law, consider
the consequences of adopting the "selected defamations" construction.
As has been pointed out, it requires the judge to go outside the statute
to determine whether a given communication is defamatory. Although
t is would seem to broaden the definition of "defamation," it has, in
fact, precisely the opposite effect. The reason is, as will be illustrated
hv the following discussion, that this construction is used only when
the covrt has lang age before it which clearly falls within the terms
(f the statute but which the court desires to hold non-defamatory in
o,der to keep the case away from the jury. If the legislature intended
to make a substantive change in the law of torts by thus restricting
the meaning of "defamation," is it reasonable to suppose it would
choose a criminal statute to effectuate its intent? It is submitted that
to state the question is to answer it; that the "selected defamations"
11. Cowpare Moritz v. Kansas City Star Co., 364 Mo. 32, 258 S.W.2d 583
195: ) (statute codifies common law definition of libel) with Coots v. Payton,
r',w note 117.
11fo. See text at notes 9-41 :,iz/p,.
121), See Keemle & Field v. Sass, 12 Mo. 499, 504 (1849) Nelson v. Musgrave,
10i Mo. 1348, 649 (1847). See also Price v. Whitely, 50 Blo. 469, 440-41 (1872).
121 Nelson v. Musgrave, .rupna note 120, at 649. The statute also contains the
larwuae "to blacken and vilify the memory of one who is dead." D1o. REv. STAT.
§ 559410 (1949).
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interpretation, in spite of the concededly unfortunate language of the
statute, is unreasonable.
Unreasonable though it may be, however, this construction is legally
valid in Missouri and can be utilized by the court at any time. The
case which first enunciated it was Diener v. Star-Chronicle Publishing
Co.'122 The chauffeur of an automobile which struck a child who later
died sued on an article which said of him, in part:
... a man who had wantonly taken the life of an innocent child
in direct violation of the law.
Further, such a finding would make the chauffeur responsible
for a criminal offense, for which he might be sent to the peniten-
tiary for life ....
Thus, on the single and unsupported statement of Chauffeur
Diener who did the killing, the killer was released. 23
The article was held not defamatory. It had been said in a previous
case that the statute was an attempt to codify the common law defini-
tion of libel. 124 It had twice been held that any language coming
within the statutory terms constituted a libel.12  In spite of these
precedents, the court in the Diener case held that it was not enough
that the language fell within the statute. Stating that "the controlling
words ... are 'malicious defamation,' ,,12 the court remarked:
[H] e who thinks that an article merely having that tendency [of
holding a person up to hatred, contempt, or ridicule] is either a
civil or a criminal libel has studied the law of libel to little pur-
pose . 127
The court said that defamatory statements must be statements of
fact12 8 But one early Missouri case characterized as defamatory the
appellations "imp of the devil" and "cowardly snail"12 while another
had flatly stated that putting the defamation in terms of a question
was of no avail to the defendant.130 The court said that the words were
used "argumentatively and by way of hypothesis" and that the article
would seem to be but a "roundabout insinuation."'' 1 But an earlier
case allowed recovery for language which began "He is thought no
more of than ... .1-32 The court said that the malice of the article must
122. 232 Mo. 416, 135 S.W. 6 (1911).
123. Id. at 422-23, 135 S.W. at 7.
124. McGinnis v. George Knapp & Co., 109 Mo. 131, 18 S.W. 1134 (1892).
125. Cook v. Globe Printing Co., 227 Mo. 471, 127 S.W. 332 (1910); Julian v.
Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S.W. 496 (1908).
126. 232 Mo. at 433, 135 S.W. at 11.
127. Ibid.
128. 232 Mo. at 429, 135 S.W. at 9.
129. Price v. Whitely, 50 Mo. 439 (1872). It must be conceded that the de-
fendant in the Whitely case pleaded truth, however.
130. Johnson v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 65 Mo. 539 (1877).
131. 232 Mo. at 429, 135 S.W. at 9-10.
132. Nelson v. Musgrave, 10 Mo. 648 (1847).
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flow from the writer to the person defamed, 1"3 a statement for which
there was no Iissouri authority I and common law precedent was
clearly to the contrary. , The dissenting judges cited cases holding
the use of the single word "killer" defamatory.":Q The court said that
these precedents would not be followed unless 'kl" was "'used in a
connection showing it means to charge a crime,""7 in spite of a
precedent only four years old holding the words "did well in a legis-
lative way" capable of being defamatory. '" It was to reach this
decision that the "selected defamations" construction was invented.
For a time it appeared that the Diener case would be forgotten, for
four subsequent cases disregarded it in holding that all communica-
tions falling within the terms of the statute were libels.M  But lan-
g uage from the case is periodically disinterred 40 and there is no doubt
that it is still precedent on the problem of interpreting the statute.
Besides narrowing the common law concept of "defamation," the
existence of the "selected defamations" construction has a number of
practical consequences that require mention. Suppose the words com-
plined of are ambiguous, such as "did well in a legislative way."
Whether these words are capable of being understood in a defamatory
sense is a question on which reasonable minds might differ, and it
would therefore be submitted to the jury."' The standard which
Saries normally receive to assist them in determining this question is
the Missouri criminal libel statute.",' But by using the different
standard permitted by the "selected defamations" construction, an
sppellate court can reverse a verdict for plaintiff on the ground the
case should never have been submitted to the jury because the words
1'l. 232 Mo. at 429, 135 S.W. at 10. Contra, Seested v. Post Printing & Pub-
lishinc Co., 326 Mo. 559, 31 S.W.2d 1045 (1930).
131. Except the same court's decision in the companion case of Diener v. Star-
Chkoniecle Publishing Co., 230 Mo. 613, 132 S.W. 1143 (1910). The authority
reied upon by the companion case, viz., Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, 34 Atl. 411
(1896), patently did not support the proposition. It involved a defense of quali-
fied privilege. The court said the express malice necessary to overcome thi sr'h-
b1 q, had to be directed at the plaintiff rather than at some third person. Id. at
,42. See note 9 sapra.
135. Thus calling a husband "a cuckold" defamed the wife at common law.
RESTATIMENT § 564, comment e & illustration .5. See also id. § 580.
13C. 232 Mo. at 443, 135 SA.. at 14 (dissenting opinion).
137. The statement is from the companion case, 230 Mo. at 626, 1 2 S.W. at
1148, hut the ruling was specifically adopted in the instant case. 232 Mo. at 428,
I5 S.W. at 9.
I:'8. Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S.W. 496 (1908).
139, Eby v. Wilson, 315 Mo. 1214, 289 S.W. 639 (1926); Link v. Hamnn, 270
Mo. 319, 193 S.W. 587 (1917); Walsh v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 250 Mo. 142,
IZ-7 S.W. 326 (1913); Orchard v. Globe Printing Co., 240 Mo. 575, 144 S.W. 812(1912).
140. E,q., Coots v. Payton, 365 Mo. 180 280 S.W.2d 47 (1955); Hylsky v.
(Unhe Democrat Publishing Co., 348 Mo. 83, 152 SW.2d 119 (1941).
141. REsTATEMSNT § 614, comment c.
142, E.g., Seested v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 326 Mo. V9_, 91 S.W.2d
1045 (1130); Sotham v. Drovers Telegram Co., 239 To. 606, 144 S.W. 428 (1912).
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were not capable of being defamatory. Accordingly, a trial judge can
err by failing to use the "selected defamations" construction and sub-
mitting the case to the jury. But he can also err by using the con-
struction and keeping from the jury a case which the appellate court
thinks should have been submitted, this time because the words fell
within the terms of the statute.
Why the court has invited all of these difficulties into the law it has
never explained and no reason is readily discernible. If the statute
is construed as codifying the common law, nothing is gained by its
application because the court theoretically applies the common law
anyway.4 3 If the "selected defamations" interpretation is used, apply-
ing the statute is an empty gesture because it furnishes no guide for
determining what is defamatory. And under the latter construction,
application of the statute to civil litigation has at least two' 44 dele-
terious consequences: (1) it narrows the common law definition of
"defamatory" in an uncertain degree, thus keeping cases from the
jury which would have been submitted under the common law; and
(2) it purports to establish two distinct criteria for the determination
of the defamation issue, one for the court and another for the jury.
In addition, its very existence makes it unclear which standard the
trial judge is supposed to apply when ruling upon a demurrer.
Finally, since it can hardly be contended that the legislature desired
these consequences to flow from the enactment of a criminal statute,
the construction is legally untenable. It is submitted that the best
available solution to these difficulties is to overrule the cases applying
the statute to civil litigation and to return to an application of the
common law. Less desirable, but certainly preferable to the "selected
defamations" interpretation, is to construe the statute as an attempt'"
to codify the common law. The Diener case, and all others affirming
the "selected defamations" construction, should be overruled at the
earliest opportunity.
143. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.010 (1949).
144. With new media of communication, the physical form in which a defama-
tion must be conveyed to constitute libel is no longer clear. Application of the
statute to civil cases to determine this question appears not to have been con-
sidered in Missouri. It is believed, however, that applying the statute to deter-
mine the criterion of form would be a third harmful consequence because it would
freeze the law and discard the flexibility of the common law. See Comment, supra
note 12.
145. The first case to interpret the statute clearly recognized that it was only
an attempt to define a libel:
The attempts.., to define a libel.. . have never been so comprehensive and
accurate as to comprehend all cases that may arise .... And such attempts
in this regard ... resemble similar attempted definitions of fraud.
McGinnis v. George Knapp & Co., 109 M -o. 131, 138, 18 S.W. 1134, 1135 (1892).
This construction would retain some flexibility in the law both as to the cri-
terion of what is defamatory (see text at notes 9-11 supra) and the criterion of
physical form (see note 144 supra).
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is not the intention of the writers to belabor a point previously
made at some length. But before making recommendations for
changes, it will perhaps be permissible at this point to set out two
examples of decisions which appear both arbitrary and inconsistent
and to attempt an explanation for them.
(a) The Problem of Ignored Precedent
Kunz v. Hartiwig4 was a slander case for words charging that
plaintiff "had had intercourse" with defendant. In reversing a judg-
ment for plaintiff, the court of appeals held that the words must
be construed in their most innocent sense and therefore the petition
did not state a cause of action because defendant could have meant
"social" or "political" intercourse. At the time this case was decided,
there were five supreme court decisions holding to the contrary, that
words must be construed as they are normally understood.1 17 With
the Kunz case should be compared Frank v. Herring,148 another
slander case in which the allegedly defamatory words were: "The
sheriff made a catch. He caught Marcella [plaintiff] and Cellum [a
negro],-earlier." In affirming a judgment for plaintiff, the court
of appeals adverted to testimony that there were "rumors" plaintiff
was "going with" a negro; it took "judicial notice" that this must
have been for immoral purposes; and it consequently concluded that
the word "caught" must be construed to mean caught in the act of
intercourse, although there was no testimony anyone so understood
the words.1 49
A more recent illustration of inconsistency can be gained by com-
paring four libel cases decided by the supreme court within the last
ten years. In Jacobs v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.,50 the
court recognized and discussed at length the common law rule that
words which injure a person in his business, trade, profession, or
office, may be defamatory when the same words said of another indi-
vidual would not be.," But the following year, in Creekmore v.
Runnels,z a minister sued on words charging him with "heresy."
After discussing a number of cases involving defamation of ministers,
the court, without distinguishing these cases, held the words not
146. 151 Mo. App. 94, 131 S.W. 721 (1910).
147. Diener v. Star-Chronicle Publishing Co., 230 Mo. 613, 132 S.W. 1143
(1910) ; Ukman v. Daily Record Co., 189 Mo. 378, 88 S.W. 60 (1905) ; St. James
Militarv Academy v. Gaiser, 125 Mo. 517, 28 S.W. 851 (1894); McGinnis v.
George'Knapp & Co., 109 Mo. 131, 18 S.W. 1134 (1892); Johnson v. St. Louis
Dispatch Co, 65 Mo. 539 (1877).
148. 240 Mo. App. 425, 208 S.W.2d 783 (1948).
149. Id at 433-34, 208 S.W.2d at 787-88.
150. 258 Mo. 674, 216 S.W.2d 523 (1948).
151. See RESTATEMENT §§ 559, comments b & c, 573.
152. 359 Mo. 1020, 224 S.W.2d 1007 (1949).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1957/iss4/2
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
defamatory. Although the opinion is unclear, its tenor indicates that
the court in fact ignored the common law rule so clearly recognized
in the Jacobs case. 153 But four years later, in Moritz v. Kansas City
Star Co.," 4 the court seemingly returned to the Jacobs case. The
article sued on was a report of a street car accident which related that
plaintiff had been arrested for disturbing the victims by shouting
"I'm a lawyer," and taking names and addresses. At least part of the
article was true. Nevertheless, the holding was that the words were
not only defamatory-they charged plaintiff with "unprofessional
conduct"-but sufficiently malicious to overcome defendant's plea of
qualified privilege.15. Finally, in Coots v. Payton,"6 the court decided
that the single adjective "infamous" was defamatory. Can the Creek-
more decision be reconciled with the other three?
It is believed that one explanation for these seemingly conflicting
decisions lies in the fact that the cases are in such a state of confusion
that judges have long since given up trying to find valid and control-
ling Missouri precedent. This explanation is not entirely speculative,
for as Judge Lamm observed in Orchard v. Globe Printing Co.:"'
He would be a bold judge who would say that some of the learn-
ing is not incomprehensible or that there is not much discord in
the cases. It seems settled that each case should stand on its own
facts, since the language used is rarely the same.58
Returning an element of certainty and predictability to the law is
thus another reason why some reform should be undertaken.
(b) Recommendations
It is believed that no improvement in the law will be possible until
the confusing common law terminology is abandoned. It is recom-
mended that all such terms be discarded, particularly those ending
with the suffix "per se," and that lucid, descriptive, words, such as
"defamatory on its face," "giving rise to a presumption of damage,"
etc., be substituted. This reform will return clarity to the law and,
perhaps, make precedent significant. It will also make the other
reforms here suggested feasible.
In the present state of the law, it is impossible to determine which,
if any, libels require an allegation and proof of special damages. If
the court feels such a requirement is justified, it should formulate
some meaningful rule clarifying it. It is submitted, however, that be-
153. The court designated "heresy" as "a broad, nebulous abstraction." Id. at
1025, 224 S.W.2d at 1009. It is submitted there is nothing "abstract" or "nebu-
lous" about calling a minister a heretic.
154. 364 Mo. 32, 258 S.W.2d 583 (1953).
155. See note 9 supra for a brief discussion of privilege.
156. 365 Mo. 180, 280 S.W.2d 47 (1955).
157. 240 Mo. 575, 144 S.W. 812 (1912).
158. Id. at 588, 144 S.W. at 815.
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fore a requirement of special damages is firmly imposed upon the law
of libel, the court ought to consider the objectives to be achieved by
this action. If, on the other hand, the court feels a return to the
common law is desirable, the cases deviating from it could easily be
overruled. Technically, overruling would be unnecessary since the
statements are only dicta.
The difficulties raised by the constitutional provision that the jury
judge the law as well as the fact appear to have been long settled.
The practice of reviving these difficulties by using the provision to
dispose of cases, as was done four years ago in Fitch V. Star-Times
Publishibg Co.,', is believed to be a bad one that can only cause ad-
ditional confusion.
No reason has been offered, nor is one apparent, why the statute
defining criminal libel should be applied to civil suits. It is believed
the law would be improved if the cases holding it applicable were
overruled.
JULES B. GERARD
GERHARD J. PETZALL
MARTIN SCHIFF, JR.
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